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At present, humanitarian* demining in most affected areas begins with a
United Nations(UN)led emergency response, which is controlled by ex
pats, who usually have a military background and who are largely paid
for by "earmarked" donations from UN countries. Those donations
sometimes take the form of staff and goods. At the same time, as the UN
arrives (and sometimes before), the specialist charitablyfunded
clearance groups, which are funded by an individual government's aid
budget or by trusts and donor charities, tend to move into the area. The
HALO Trust makes a point of, whenever possible, being in dangerous
areas first. The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and the Norwegian
People's Aid (NPA) are widely represented around the world and
probably have the highest profile of the other "charitable" clearance
groups. Following the charitable groups come the commercial
companies. Some of these companies are regionally based, as with
MineTech and Mechem in Southern Africa. Other companies might
appear to be regionally based, but they are actually initiated by profit
taking outsiders, as is increasingly the case in the former Yugoslavia
(e.g., UXB International). A few organizations, such as the recently
suspended Afrovita in Mozambique, are locally based although they are
sometimes run by outsiders. (It is reported that Afrovita has recently
been suspended by the Mozambican National Demining Council for not
delivering written statements of purpose for approval. However, this
situation might be temporary.)

Exceptions to the above situation do exist in every affected region. The
UN's Mines Action Centre Afghanistan (MACA) is the most striking
exception. It funds a group of semiautonomous commercial demining**
NonGovernmental Organizations (NGO) from its base in Pakistan, and
by doing so, it has preempted the slow move toward commercial
demining that is found elsewhere.

While a few new charitablyfunded demining groups do exist (such as
MgM in Angola), most of the new players are commercial companies.
Names such as Danex, BacTec., ABC, ECC, and DeDeComp join the

familiar oldies such as Bombs Away, Gerbera, and RONCO. With the
massive funding available for work in the former Yugoslavia, European
groups from equipment suppliers to Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
companies are keen to get involved, and new allegiances and companies
arise weekly. Elsewhere around the world, the process is slower, but it
appears to be unstoppable. Both MineTech and Mechem are keen to
operate outside Southern Africa, and MineTech has won contracts in
Bosniabreaking a tradition of oneway assistance by taking Africans to
Europe in order to help solve the problem, but mostly, it is a oneway
business.

One reason for the growth of commercial demining is that it can appear
to be cheaper than the alternatives. Some remote funders might also
believe it is more "professional." As far as cost advantages are
concerned, a real cost comparison could only be made if you had
identical areas cleared, number of devices found, land area opened up,
operating conditions, terrain, vegetation, security constraints, speed, etc.
In other words, meaningful cost comparisons are extremely hard to get.
Examples at the extremes of expense and cheapness do exist (see later in
this article), but as exceptions, they are not a reliable guide. As far as
"professionalism" is concerned, the wellthoughtof companies are
usually staffed by men who have worked in the charitable sector, so the
same level of professional ability pertains.

Another reason for people establishing commercial companies rather
than charities is simply that it is generally much harder to establish a
charity than a company. The paperwork and the search for initial funds
can take far too long to get, and when finally granted, it can be hard to
allocate money for continuity across funding gaps. So demining charities
rarely arise, and when they do, they tend to be headed by people with
intense personal commitment (such as the late Colin Mitchell, HALO;
the McGraths, MAG; and Kruessen and Ehlers, MgM). Charities have to
accept all manner of restrictions and require a peculiarly persistent
determination to get going and keep going.

High cost is often attributed to UNorganized demining. This situation is
not always down to the cost of the UN bureaucracy. For example, when a
donor country sends UN military Technical Advisors (TAs) to support
demining activities in an affected region, the typical cost of each TA
place runs to US$200,000 per year. Often, each TA does a sixmonth
tour, half of which is spent learning the ropes when he arrives, and the
other half is spent preparing to hand over the position to his successor
when he leaves. The TA might have gained experience, but he is unlikely
to have contributed a great deal to the mineclearance effort. The cost of
his input is, therefore, inordinately high.

The above example relates to one UN scenario. MACA in Afghanistan is
a contrast. The few TA expat staff involved there are longterm, and
they run a unique system that makes their demining costspersquare
meter among the lowest in the world. (They claim to be the lowest, but
no realistic comparison exists.) The MACA system came about because
of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA) deciding not to be based inside the country (its base is in
Pakistan), and many other features of MACA are unique to the area, so it
could not be easily duplicated in another region. However, MACA costs
are low partly because all of the staff of the commercial demining
companies it leads are local to the region and so are paid at "local" rates.
The local management of demining companies happens in Southern
Africa too. In this case, using a locallymanaged and staffed company
can appear to be supporting the provision of an indigenous demining
capacity as well as saving money, so it can be attractive to donors
looking for the best value. (Donor beware!)

While all commercial demining companies share the concern of making
a profit, huge differences exist between their working ethos. Neither the
size of the company nor its country of origin are reliable indicators of the
company's approach or its ethics. Some of the early commercial players
were Europeanbased, as large as Royal Ordnance or as small as Rimfire,
and they still acquired a bad reputation. Rimfire went to the wall, and
Royal Ordnance continues. Many other commercial companies (with or
without internationally experienced staff) have also behaved in a suspect
manner, but they have avoided the spotlight.

Some commercial companies are run by people who have moved
sideways from the charitablyfunded or UN sector and have both
experience of ontheground demining and high personal standards.
Some other commercial companies are run by remote businessmen or by
exmilitary men who have little or no actual experience in demining. The
latter are not necessarily people who will take selfregulation as seriously
as selfinterest.

At the top of a sliding scale of humanitarian credentials in commercial
demining, I cite the examples of Greenfield Consultants and Specialist
Gurkha Services (SGS). Greenfield works in Angola and Kurdish Iraq (at
least). SGS works in Mozambique and Cambodia (at least). They are
very different organizations, but they both have one important feature in
common. When possible, both groups work with development NGOs:
Greenfield works with CARE in Angola, and SGS works with Handicap

International in both Mozambique and in Cambodia. The safety records
of Greenfield and SGS, incidentally, are reported to be excellent. Their
senior staff are men with handson experience, and these men appear to
have the commercial insight to see which way the wind is blowing.

At the other end of the scale are "cowboy" companies that have been
established to make a fast buck from a "fashionable" donor area. These
companies might lack concern for humanitarian issues, but that lack of
concern does not necessarily make them bad at clearing ground. Between
the end points of this sliding scale come varying levels of demining
competence and indifference to humanitarian issues, and these levels can
even vary within the lifetime of the same organization. During my field
research, I have found some commercial demining companies that have
laid mines to discredit other companies, laid obvious mines and
ordnances in areas in order to get an easy clearance contract, left mines
and ordnances that were clearly visible but were just outside of the area
they were clearing, and for financial advantage, claimed that there were
mines in a clear area. It all happens or has happened. The question is not
how to punish the companies that have behaved in this way, but rather,
the question is how to control the future behavior of these companies.
One answer is found in the best examplesMACA, Greenfield, and the
SGS.

MACA has TA staff on hand to make sure that standards are maintained
and improved whenever possible. They are acting, effectively, as the
humanitarian NGO partner to the commercial companies they support.
Greenfield and SGS worked alongside humanitarian NGOs and thus
have an external check to complement their own. And while the best
companies might not require external regulation today, it is always
conceivable that they would change hands or run into financial
difficulties that changes their priorities; therefore, some kind of
independent quality assurance should always be built into a contract with
a commercial company.

A few new players have entered the charitable NGO field, and these
organizations have demining as only one part of their expressed purpose.
The Irish newcomer HMD is an example in Angola. (HMD has not yet
started to work on clearing mines and rebuilding hospitals, so it is too
early to judge how well the marriage of purposes will work.)

When a direct association with a humanitarian organization is not
possible, it must be up to the funders to dictate the "humanitarian" part of
commercial mine clearance. The funder should accept responsibility for

checking every stage, from survey to "declared safe," and checking that
the standards are applied to deminer equipment and working conditions
as well as ground clearance. In an ideal situation, the national
government or a UN team of independent assessors can assume this role,
but this situation cannot be seen as leaving the funders free from
responsibility. The national government and the UN have made moves to
control standards. For example, in Angola deminers must either be
trained by INAROEE or be trained by an INAROEEapproved instructor.
Just as with the Portuguese National Demining Center (CDN) in
Mozambique, INAROEE must approve the statement of purpose of all
demining groups. There are examples of organizations failing in both
countries, so the test seems "real." Unfortunately, I hear that the same
rigor is not applied to the INAROEE/United Nations Office for Project
Services (UNOPS) test of quality assessors in Angola, and some
"failures" continue to work there (presumably as a result of conditions
dictated by remote funders).

The approach of remote funders can often be questionable. Smaller
funders might simply want to donate, feel good, and forget the situation.
Larger donors might find all kinds of political considerations influencing
their judgment. For example, when an organization like the European
Union has decided to fund clearance in an area, there might be
considerable loss of face and political advantage if they cannot do so. In
those circumstances, local governments can impose all manner of
unreasonable conditions and constraints (usually financial, but also on
which organization actually does the work), and the funder might be
pressed to accept those terms. This situation happened recently in
Zimbabwe, where the contracts to both clear and QA the "Cordon
Sanitaire" border minefield has been awarded very controversially.
Obviously, funders should have the integrity to avoid political
manipulation, but their inability to do so is probably the responsibility of
their political masters rather than the individuals directly involved in the
situation.

Around the world, a subindustry of quality control specialists has arisen.
Some companies place experienced men in the field with the teams they
are assessing, but at least one company has been known to subcontract
the work to a commercial clearance company that simply sends in its
spare deminers. The assessors, therefore, must also be subject to
regulation.

Below, I suggest five ways a funder could control the activities of
commercial demining companies. Some of these suggestions will seem
obvious. The reason I have included them is that they have all been
overlooked in the recent past.

1. Surveys of minefields can currently consist of a few GPS readings
and the report of a locallyavailable exsoldier with regard to mine
positions, types, and numbers. Local information is essential, but it
should be confirmed by actually locating at least some of the
reported items. As is the case in Bosnia, detailed minearea
surveys (sometimes called "Level 2," "Technical," etc.) should
always be comprehensive. To allow this process to take place,
someone must pay for the surveys. (Currently, someone does not
always pay for these surveys.) The surveys could cover a suspect
area in entirety and include UXOs, etc. If there are fewer than a set
number (five?) pieces of ordnance or mines in the area, the survey
team should destroy them. Survey costs could be based on those in
Bosnia, which are not reported to be generous. Alternatively, the
UN personnel in a country could undertake directing all detailed
survey tasks. As it stands, where commercial companies thrive
they can seek funding from donors directly, and those donors can
insist that the survey is done for free before deciding whether to
fund clearance (as with UNICEF in Mozambique during 1997).

2. Detailed survey reports should be put out to tender whenever
commercial companies are to be employed. Each interested party
should receive a copy (perhaps on payment of a charge).

3. Funders should appoint a whollyindependent demining assessor to
carry out permanent documented qualitycontrol assessment to
ensure that working methods are approved and that the ground is
surveyed and cleared to the level expected. That assessor should
not be from the same country as those tendering, nor should he be
from the country where the work is being performed. He should be
suitably equipped so that he can be as "independent" as is possible
while in the field.

4. Companies operating in Southern Africa learned that
Mozambicans can be recruited for half the price of a Zimbabwean
deminer, so experienced men are sometimes abandoned to save a
few dollars. (The more expensive deminer only receives around
US$5 a day.) To remove the advantages of using cheap and
inexperienced "new" staff, funders should dictate the level of
deminer training, pay, and conditions and should carry out random
checks on them.

5. Funders should guarantee that deminers are properly insured (to a
predetermined level appropriate for the region) and that suitable
medevac procedures are in place. Basic protective equipment
should also be available to deminers at all times, and the use of
such equipment should be encouraged. The funder must accept that
simply telling a commercial company to provide this equipment is
not an assurance; it must be checked by the funder.

Assurances about the actions of commercial companies might be best
achieved by their working alongside a noncommercial body that relies
on the commercial company's work. It is not only that the one checks on
the otherit is also that a sense of common purpose usually arises, and
this sense of purpose keeps the commercial company on course. MAG
set the lead in terms of trying to integrate demining with general
development some years back. It was obvious to them that their work
would be better targeted and achieve a greater impact if they worked in
close collaboration with other agencies in the area. As a charityfunded
NGO themselves, it was relatively easy for MAG to "marry" with other
charitable organizationsalthough the clash of military and development
backgrounds has not always led to an easy life. The same clash of
military and development backgrounds has been overcome by Greenfield
and SGS in their work with development NGOs, and this work proves
that such a merging can be done if the desire to do so is present.

To review the points that were made, commercial demining is
burgeoning. Some companies have set a high standard; others need to be
regulated. A system of regulations could be imposed by the funder, the
UN, or by linking the work of commercial demining companies with that
of humanitarian NGOs. Examples of all three control systems exist as
models although the current models of remote control by the funder are
less than satisfactory. Demining donorsgovernments, trusts, or
individualscan be giving for many reasons. If it matters to the donor
that the money is effective at getting ground cleared, the donor should
look to the dynamic charitable or UN clearance groups or the
commercial companies with established humanitarian credentials. The
future I favor is the continued integration of demining with wider
development aims and with a place for commercial demining in that
union.

* "Humanitarian" demining is a loose description that seems to cover any
groundclearance not being done as a part of a military operation. I use
the term more strictly. The Oxford English Dictionary defines
"humanitarian" as "concerned with promoting human welfare" and the
word "humane" as "benevolent, compassionate, and merciful."

** I use "demining" to mean "ground clearance," which is the removing
of all explosive materials from a defined area.

